

ntopConf Retrospective

- 20 Years of ntop Pisa October 2018
- ntopConf 2019 Padova, May 2019
- ntopConf 2020 Online
- •ntopConf 2022 Milano, June 2022
- •ntopConf 2023 Pisa, September 2023






ntopConf 2023

- First ntopConf in English
- International speakers: CH, DE, IT, FR, US.
- Completely self-funded event.
- Two days event: training and conference where the community speaks.
- Next ntopConf scheduled for late 2024 or mid 2025 (we'll discuss later)




Why Pisa as Location?

- Everything has started here in 1998.
- Initial project goal was to monitor the traffic of Unipi.it: gopher, ftp, and www.
- No available tool for traffic analysis, costly commercial licenses, not designed for university needs.
- ntop was born as a short term project and eventually turned into a life-long tool, project, life....





25 Years of ntop [1/2]



606 Pkts/770.7				ning on [hme		Z Kbp∎
Host	Ret		Sent	TCP	y Kops/349 WOP	ICMP
more	В	257.4 Kb		256.6 Kb	769	9
zetant	B	204.2 Kb	232.3 Kb	204.2 Kb	. 0	ĕ
tar	B	42.9 Kb		42.9 Kb	õ	õ
ibook	B	32.7 Kb			ō	ō
tecserv	Ř	791	9	0	595	196
bugnol i	В	602	1.4 Kb	ā	602	
urano	В	496	5.1 Kb	ē	496	ō
utlrouter	R	98	0	ø	0	98
mis	S	9	212	0	0	0
fiorella	S	9	486	0	0	9
piutltst02	S	9	1.4 Kb	0	9	9
mostardi	S	9	952	9	0	0
193.43.104.55	S	9	588	0	0	0
itest1	S	9	928	0	0	0
rolly	S	9	46	0	0	0
itinž	S	9	92	0	0	0
3comhub1	S	9	610	0	0	0
re	S	9	5.6 Kb	0	0	0
pi100	S	9	1.2 Kb	0	0	0
lcardini	S	9	546	0	0	9
mbeng	S	9	602	0	0	9
i test2	S	9	600	0	0	0
fossati-a	S	9	960	0	0	9
hpwsutl	S S	9	3.1 Kb	0	0	9
catle	S	9	120	0	0	9
aut01b	S S	9	243	0	0	9
biu	S	9	542	0	0	9
artico2	S	9	226	0	0	0



25 Years of ntop [2/2]

- •Private company focusing on network traffic monitoring, security and high-speed networking.
- •In 1998 we have released the original ntop, an open source webbased network monitoring application.
- Today we develop in-house various products both open source (https://github.com/ntop/ (ntop/ (<a href="https://github.com/ntop
- •Thanks to open-source and to our policy to give free software to education, ntop is a well known brand in this market and many universities use our tools.
- In 2023 we celebrate our 25th anniversary

Why ntop?

- •Software developed from the ground up: kernel drivers, application, libraries. Everything is under our control.
- •No external dependencies: price and features won't be a surprise, that allows us not to raise prices.
- •More than two decades in business: we plan to stay around.
- •Vendor neutral: we want to offer you what is the best available, with no hidden vendor dependencies.
- •Multi-platform support: Linux, Windows, MacOS, FreeBSD.



International Sales Presence

Americas

- FirstLight [USA/Canada]
- Sytd [Mexico]

Europe

- Gravitate [Germany]
- Hosting Solutions [Europe]
- Info-Stor [UK, Nordics]
- Lugos [France]
- Orsenna [France]
- Miniserver [Europe]
- quattroSEC [Austria]
- verXo [Europe]
- Vunkers [Spain]
- Würth-Phoenix [Italy]



Asia / APAC / Middle East

- Assured Network Solutions [Australia/New Zealand]
- Hongke Technology [China/Taiwan]
- IOE Soft [Korea]
- Info-Stor [India/Pakistan and neighbouring countries]
- Linksoft [Taiwan]
- · Jupiter Technology Corp. [Japan]
- npacket [Korea]
- ntopKorea [Korea]
- · <u>Softense</u> [Israel]
- Technovage [Cambodia]

ntop R&D

Italy


International Sales

Switzerland

Note: New partner

nBox Devices

- Ntop is traditionally a software company.
- However in some cases such as high-performance (40/100 Gbit) or for recording traffic to disk at scale, a pre-built device can be an option.
- Other users prefer to use a ntop-optimized device instead of creating a custom one.
- With HostingSolutions.it we have created a new generation of high-end hardware-based devices.
- For low-end devices we still partner with <u>miniserver.it</u> that has cost-effective solutions for SMEs.
- All devices can be shipped everywhere in the world.






Professional Training


- Started in 2022 due to community request. Next round: Nov 7th-23rd
- Divided in 6 sections, 90 minutes each
 - Introduction
 - Installation and Licensing
 - Network Intelligence
 - Flow Collection
 - Historical Data
- Active Monitoring and SNMP



https://www.ntop.org/support/training/professional-training/

eShop Sales Statistics









Major Highlights Since ntopConf 2022



Say Hello to nTap [1/2]


• Virtual software tap designed to deliver in a secure fashion, packets to a remote destination for promoting observability when mirroring or other packet copy techniques are not possible (e.g. the cloud or containers) or too expensive to deploy (e.g. on an OT factory).





Say Hello to nTap [2/2]

- •nTap uses state-of-the-art encryption technology and packet aggregation techniques for reducing bandwidth usage and preserving privacy also on public networks.
- Fully containers, Kubernetes and VM compatible.
- •nProbe and ntoping embed the collection component for simple deployment.
- It can be used as an embedded component on low-power and IoT/OT container-friendly devices.






Smart Traffic Recording [1/2]

- •Traditionally packet recording is the act of dumping all network traffic to disk in pcap format so that it can be retrieved if needed: ntopng allows you to drill down from Alerts -> Flows -> Packets.
- In the past years we have added the ability to discard/shunt selected traffic (e.g. encrypted or streaming) and index traffic while dumping (i.e. extract me all the Zoom traffic).
- As networks increase in speed, disk space "lasts" less, and we need yet another level of "compression".
- We have combined cybersecurity signals (flow risks) with traffic dump in order to save (much) longer traffic with cyber threats.



Smart Traffic Recording [2/2]




- Process Network events generated by ntopng or third party tools (e.g. Suricata)
- Use a 1st level storage to implement continuous recording with a short data retention (cache)
- Use a 2nd level storage to archive traffic for Network events with a longer data retention (archive)



nBoxUI [1/4]

 The original nBoxUI was more than a decade old, written with ancient programming languages and hard to extend and adapted to new needs.






nBoxUI [2/4]

- Integrated in Cockpit, an Open Source web-based UI for servers sponsored by Red Hat
- Runs on most Linux distributions, including Ubuntu, Debian, RedHat
- Becoming a standard for managing Linux servers
- Extensible by means of plugins (Javascript API)
 - ontop plugins written in modern HTTP and Vue.js
 - Users can extend it



nBoxUI: Configure [3/4]






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nBoxUI: Notify [4/4]






Suricata/Zeek on Demand [1/2]

- IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) are computationally intensive tasks that make them unfit to analyse traffic at 10+Gbit.
- Ntop tools are instead able to keep up at 100+ Gbit while analysing traffic for cybersecurity or detecting anomalies.
- Suricata is signature-based, Zeek is a cybersensor, ntopng is behavioural based.
- Problem statement: how can we speed-up Suricata/Zeek by reducing ingress traffic to the one that is relevant for cybersecurity?




Suricata/Zeek on Demand [2/2]





Scada/OT Monitoring [1/2]



Behavioural Checks

All (162) Enabled (107) Disabled (55) × Search Script: modb Filter Categories * Category **Description** Name Interface Severity **Values** Action Trigger an alert when an invalid ModbusTCP ModbusTCP Invalid Notice 🕕 **●** transition is detected **Transition ModbusTCP Too Many** Trigger an alert when a flow reports a number of Error 🚹 exceptions exceeding the specified threshold **Exceptions ModbusTCP Unexpected** Trigger an alert when an unexpected ModbusTCP Error A 3, 6, 16 **●** Function code is detected **Function Code**



Scada/OT Monitoring [2/2]

Show 10 😂 Entries							
Actio	Date/Time	Score	Application	Alert	Flow	Description	
≣▼	12:04:21	100	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code	172.16.203.200:3343 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	Function Code 'Write Single Regi.	•••
≣▾	12:04:21	200	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Too Many Exceptions	172.16.203.200:3343 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	1 Exceptions	
≣▾	12:04:21	300	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code	172.16.203.200:3343 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	Function Code 'Write Multiple Re.	
■▼	12:04:21	100	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Too Many Exceptions	172.16.203.200:1788 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	1 Exceptions	
≣▼	12:04:21	100	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Too Many Exceptions	172.16.203.200:2634 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	1 Exceptions	
≣▾	12:04:21	200	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code	172.16.203.200:2634 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖	Function Code 'Write Multiple Re.)
≣▾	12:04:21	100	TCP:Modbus DPI	ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code	192.168.3.201:54047 🗖 🔁 192.168.3.30:502 🗖	Function Code 'Read Coils (1)' de	9

Alerts



▲ Alert: ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code 172.16.203.200:3343 172.16.203.5:502 Overview							
Alert	ModbusTCP Invalid Function Code						
Flow Peers [Client / Server]	172.16.203.200:3343 🗖 🔁 172.16.203.5:502 🗖						
Protocol / Application	rotocol / Application TCP: Modbus						
Date/Time	12:05:46						
Score	200						
Description	Function Code 'Write Sing	ngle Register (6)' detected					
Other Issues	ModbusTCP Too Many Exceptions						
Traffic Info	Client to Server Traffic	82.15 KB					
	Main Direction	Server → Client					
	Server to Client Traffic	139.95 KB					

Zoom/MS Teams Monitoring [1/2]

•nDPI has been enhanced...

```
38 Skype_TeamsCall TCP Acceptable VoIP
125 Skype_Teams UDP Acceptable VoIP
189 Zoom TCP Acceptable Video
250 Teams TCP Safe Collaborative
```


nProbe has been Enhanced to handle STUN/RTP flows with "non-standard"

```
[NFv9 57626] [IPFIX 35632.154] [Len 4] %RTP_IN_JITTER
                                                                RTP jitter (ms * 1000)
[NFv9 57627][IPFIX 35632.155][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_JITTER
                                                                RTP jitter (ms * 1000)
[NFv9 57628][IPFIX 35632.156][Len 4] %RTP_IN_PKT_LOST
                                                                Packet lost in stream (src->dst)
[NFv9 57629][IPFIX 35632.157][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_PKT_LOST
                                                                Packet lost in stream (dst->src)
[NFv9 57902][IPFIX 35632.430][Len 4] %RTP_IN_PKT_DROP
                                                                Packet discarded by Jitter Buffer (src->dst)
[NFv9 57903][IPFIX 35632.431][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_PKT_DROP
                                                                Packet discarded by Jitter Buffer (dst->src)
[NFv9 57633][IPFIX 35632.161][Len 1] %RTP_IN_PAYLOAD_TYPE
                                                                RTP payload type
[NFv9 57630] [IPFIX 35632.158] [Len 1] %RTP_OUT_PAYLOAD_TYPE
                                                                RTP payload type
                                                                Max delta (ms*100) between consecutive pkts (src->dst)
[NFv9 57631][IPFIX 35632.159][Len 4] %RTP_IN_MAX_DELTA
                                                                Max delta (ms*100) between consecutive pkts (dst->src)
[NFv9 57632][IPFIX 35632.160][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_MAX_DELTA
[NFv9 57820][IPFIX 35632.348][Len 64 varlen] %RTP_SIP_CALL_ID
                                                                        SIP call—id corresponding to this RTP stream
                                                                RTP pseudo-MOS (value * 100) (average both directions)
[NFv9 57906][IPFIX 35632.434][Len 4] %RTP_MOS
[NFv9 57842][IPFIX 35632.370][Len 4] %RTP_IN_MOS
                                                                RTP pseudo-MOS (value * 100) (src->dst)
                                                                RTP pseudo-MOS (value * 100) (dst->src)
[NFv9 57904] [IPFIX 35632.432] [Len 4] %RTP_OUT_MOS
[NFv9 57908] [IPFIX 35632.436] [Len 4] %RTP_R_FACTOR
                                                                RTP pseudo-R_FACTOR (value * 100) (average both directions)
[NFv9 57843][IPFIX 35632.371][Len 4] %RTP_IN_R_FACTOR
                                                                RTP pseudo-R_FACTOR (value * 100) (src->dst)
[NFv9 57905][IPFIX 35632.433][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_R_FACTOR
                                                                RTP pseudo-R_FACTOR (value * 100) (dst->src)
                                                                RTP Transit (value * 100) (src->dst)
[NFv9 57853][IPFIX 35632.381][Len 4] %RTP_IN_TRANSIT
[NFv9 57854][IPFIX 35632.382][Len 4] %RTP_OUT_TRANSIT
                                                                RTP Transit (value * 100) (dst->src)
[NFv9 57852][IPFIX 35632.380][Len 4] %RTP_RTT
                                                                RTP Round Trip Time (ms)
```




Zoom/MS Teams Monitoring [2/2]

Serial	Application	Proto	Client	Server	Duration	Score	Breakdown	Actual Thpt	Total Bytes∨	Info
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP 🛕	imacm1 R:50014	host-82-51-138-80.retail.telecomital R:59225	< 1 sec	50	Client Server	0 bps	726.86 KB	◄ 沙 Audio Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP 🛕	192.168.1.125 R:50042	imacm1 R:50044	<1 sec	50	Server	0 bps	400. 0 4 KB	Screen Sharing Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP (1	imacm1 R:50054	52.114.227.13 R :nat-stun-port	< 1 sec	10	Client	0 bps	58. <mark>7</mark> 6 KB	◄ 沙 Audio Stream
Q	S STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP	imacm1 R:50014	52.114.227.31 R :nat-stun-port	< 1 sec		Client	0 bps	8. 8 7 KB	【沙 Audio Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP (1	imacm1 R:50020	52.114.227.44 R :nat-stun-port	< 1 sec	10	Client	0 bps	7. 7 4 KB	(Audio Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP (1)	imacm1 R:50032	52.114.227.38 R :nat-stun-port	< 1 sec	10	Client	0 bps	7.81 KB	◄ 沙 Audio Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP 🛕	imacm1 R:50032	host-82-51-138-80.retail.telecomital R:57022	< 1 sec	50	Client	0 bps	7.03 KB	Video Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP 🔔	imacm1 R:50054	host-82-51-138-80.retail.telecomital R:52292	< 1 sec	50	Client	0 bps	5.46 KB	Screen Sharing Stream
Q	STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP (1)	imacm1 R:50044	52.114.227.31 R :nat-stun-port	< 1 sec	10	Client	0 bps	3.4 KB	Audio Stream
Q	S STUN.Skype_T DPI	UDP 🔔	imacm1 R:50020	host-82-51-138-80.retail.telecomital R :49621	<1 sec	50	Client S	0 bps	3.27 KB	■ Video Stream





Programmability: Python [1/3]






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Programmability: Python [2/3]

```
local t = flow.tls_quic()
if((flow.cli() == "192.168.1.178") and (flow.srv() == "192.168.1.1") and (t ~= nil)) then
    if(t["protos.tls.issuerDN"] == "CN=AGCOMBO, O=Technicolor, OU=1827SAZCH") then
        local score = 111
        local message = "Found unexpected TLS/QUIC flow 192.168.1.178 -> 192.168.1.1 (invalid certificate)"
        flow.triggerAlert(score, message)
        dump_flow()
    end
end
return(0)
```

Programmability: OpenAPI [3/3]





Anticipate Problems with Blacklisting

- We've made a study: most attacks are regional, available blacklists are not so effective as updated seldom, too late (daily), and not usable as first level of defence.
- We are incorporating in ntop tools the logic to generate blacklists.
- In a future release we plan to build blacklists based on our community.

Evaluating IP Blacklists Effectiveness

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IBM Research

Zurich, Switzerland

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Abstract—IP blacklists are widely used to increase network security by preventing communications with peers that have been marked as malicious. There are several commercial offerings as well as several free-of-charge blacklists maintained by volunteers on the web. Despite their wide adoption, the effectiveness of the different IP blacklists in real-world scenarios is still not clear.

In this paper, we conduct a large-scale network monitoring study which provides insightful findings regarding the effectiveness of blacklists. The results collected over several hundred thousand IP hosts belonging to three distinct large production networks highlight that blacklists are often tuned for precision, with the result that many malicious activities, such as scanning, are completely undetected. The proposed instrumentation approach to detect IP scanning and suspicious activities is implemented with home-grown and open-source software. Our tools enable the creation of blacklists without the security risks posed by the deployment of honeypots.

Index Terms—IP blacklist, network traffic analysis, host reputation, open-source software.

I. Introduction and Motivation

Reputation systems have been extensively used in network


blocking connections from anonymous VPNs or preventing web and security crawlers from scanning a network in search of vulnerabilities that could be potentially used for future attacks [40].

The widespread adoption of IP blacklists has been mostly driven by simplicity and ease of deployment. There are many commercial offerings and several free-of-charge blacklists maintained by volunteers spread across the globe [7], [19], [35]. However, when relying on IP blacklists, one has to consider the inherent limitations of the method [37]. First, blacklists are only effective when maintained in a timely manner [49]. Newly classified malware hosts must be included in the lists, while no longer malicious hosts need to be removed to minimise false positives. Second, blacklists are not equally effective across the planet. In particular, a blacklist built and maintained for a specific region (e.g., North America) is not guaranteed to be effective when deployed in another region (e.g., Europe). Third, blacklists do not necessarily cover the traffic seen in the network where they are deployed.

Cinca blacklisting approaches have inherent weaknesses

Proceedings of 2023 10th International Conference on Future Internet of Things and Cloud (FiCloud)

ntop Cloud



What's Next

- Later in this conference we will discuss
 - Future work items: new directions, additional features, how to address glitches.
 - Our community will present what they have done leveraging on our tools and how they have creatively used it.
 - We are looking for suggestions and criticism to decide what to do next.



In Case You Are Interested...



jobs@ntop.org

