Unfold the OT Network Jungle


Martin Scheu



Agenda

- OT Network Overview
- Understanding your Network
- OT Network Examples
- Risk based Monitoring


% whoami



OT Network Overview

OT Network in Theory


Purdue model




OT Network in real world

Purdue model


IT Equipment




Connectivity Evolution











Are OT Networks static?

- Common myth: OT networks are static .. ok, yes, if your network is 5 PLCs or so
- Reality:
 - Devices come and go
 - Increased IT-OT connectivity, e.g. because business needs data, Smart Meter
 - Remote access: suppliers, integrators or support engineers

Higher dynamic = higher risk \rightarrow definitely need for visibility

OT Network Examples

Example 1 - Energy Sector

Foreign Devices – kind of Bring your own Device

- Solar Systems residential ISP cloud connection for data analysis
- EV charging systems billing
- Smart Metering billing real time data

 And no, power outage in Spain/Portugal was not cyber related, also not low inertia (70% renewables), but most likely n-2 loss of power generation and RoCoF protection

Example 2 - Industrial Sector

- Preventive maintenance / maintenance contract: machine comes with own connectivity..
- Industrie 4.0: pay by use
- A mix of OT protocols
- "Old" protocols coming back, like ModbusTCP

Regulatory requirements

Germany - Attack detection system

Logging and detection of security relevant events

Switzerland - Obligation to report an attack

hence you need to be able to detect

IEC 62443-3-3:


- SR 3.2: Detect malicious code (not just block it)
- SR 3.8: Network and security event logging

Understanding your Network

OT Network Ingress/Egress Traffic

Do you have visibility?


- Can OT devices reach the internet?
- What is permited from the IT / office / engineering side to OT?
- Remote Access
 Who, when / how long, from/to, what
- Remote Sites
- Do we really have everything?



Source: https://craglem.com/

Data flows

- Field devices
- Operator Station
- Engineeringstation
- Remote Sites
- Office
- Remote Access



https://new.abb.com/control-systems/fieldbus-solutions/fim/connectivities/system800xa

Risk based Monitoring

How do OT Attacks evolve

Reality Check

- Entering through the IT/office network and pivot into the OT environment
- Direct Internet Exposure
- Third-Party or Supplier Remote Access
- Physical Access or Insider Threat
- Supply Chain Attacks




Topics V Spotlight Resources & Tools V News & Events V Careers V About V

Home / News & Events / Cybersecurity Advisories / Alert / Unsophisticated Cyber Actor(s) Targeting Operational Technology


ALERT

Unsophisticated Cyber Actor(s) Targeting Operational Technology

Release Date: May 06, 2025



Keep in mind, that..



Open Source Monitoring

Monitoring Software

Open Source and/or with professional version, support (\$)

	Description	Installation, Production and Maintenance	ICS Protocol support
Malcolm	All in one collection of open source tools, like zeek, suricata, arkime, netbox, opensearch and more	Docker only Rather complicated due the number of different components	Zeek scripts
ntop	All in one tool: - GUI - Alerting - Block-Lists and scripting	On Debian/Ubuntu easy to install	IEC-104, ModbusTCP
SURICATA®	Network analysis and threat detection software File extraction	On Debian/Ubuntu moderate to install	S7
Z zeek.	Network "logging" software File extraction	On Debian/Ubuntu moderate to install	Many, scripts

Questions?

Thank you!

Stay safe and secure

